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Abstract
The risk-sensitive foraging theory formulated in terms of the (daily) energy budget rule has been influential in
behavioural ecology as well as other disciplines. Predicting risk aversion on positive budgets and risk proneness
on negative budgets, however, the budget rule has recently been challenged both empirically and theoretically. In
this paper, we critically review these challenges as well as the original derivation of the budget rule and propose
a ‘gradual’ budget rule, which is normatively derived from a gradual nature of risk sensitivity and encompasses
the conventional budget rule as a special case. The gradual budget rule shows that the conventional budget
rule holds when the expected reserve is close enough to a threshold for overnight survival, selection pressure
being significant. The gradual view also reveals that the conventional budget rule does not need to hold when the
expected reserve is not close enough to the threshold, selection pressure being insignificant. The proposed gradual
budget rule better fits the empirical findings including those that used to challenge the conventional budget rule.
Keywords: budget rule, decision making, foraging theory, risk sensitivity, z-score model
Introduction
The Energy Budget Rule
Life is full of risky decisions, from the humdrum to matters of life or death. Understanding the drivers and the
underlying processes of risky decisions is important in many disciplines including behavioural ecology. Caraco
et al. (1980) revolutionized foraging research by introducing risk sensitivity. The risk-sensitive foraging theory
formulated in terms of the energy budget rule (Caraco et al., 1980; Stephens, 1981) has been influential not only
in behavioural ecology (Kacelnik and Mouden, 2013), but also other disciplines such as psychology, economics,
and anthropology (Kalenscher and van Wingerden, 2011; McDermott et al., 2008; Mishra, 2014; Winterhalder
et al., 1999). The budget rule predicts that, given a constant feeding option and a variable option of equal mean,
an animal should choose the constant option if the expected energy budget is higher than the threshold required
for overnight survival (i.e. the daily energy requirement) and the variable one if the expected budget is lower
than the threshold; i.e. risk aversion on positive energy budgets and risk proneness on negative budgets (Stephens,
1981). The budget rule is logically appealing: it has an analytic derivation, assuming that animals will behave
to maximise the probability of avoiding starvation (Stephens, 1981). The budget rule has also been empirically
supported (Caraco et al., 1990, 1980).
Challenges against the Budget Rule
In spite of the early successes and its significant influence, the budget rule has recently been challenged, both
empirically and theoretically. Kacelnik and Mouden (2013) and Kacelnik and Bateson (1996) review the published
empirical studies related to the budget rule and conclude that experimental support is weak. One caveat to this
conclusion is that experiments yielding negative results against the budget rule tend to involve larger species than
those yielding positive results (Kacelnik and Bateson, 1996). The z-score model which the budget rule is formally
derived from assumes a small bird foraging in order to meet daily energetic requirement in winter (Stephens, 1981),
which is less critical for large species (Caraco et al., 1990). Thus, any application of the budget rule to large species
is less suitable since the short-term energetic requirement does not impose a significant threat to survival unlike
small species (Caraco et al., 1990).
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More realistic models of risk sensitivity have been developed (McNamara, 1996), though one of the main
drawbacks with these models is that their predictions are less testable due to the increased complexity (Kacelnik
and Mouden, 2013). Kacelnik and Mouden (2013) assert that risk sensitivity does not have adaptive value by itself
and it is a side-effect caused by psychophysical features of animal information processing systems. Scalar Utility
Theory is proposed, based on Weber’s law that relates the perceived difference between stimuli to the mean value
of the stimuli (Kacelnik and Bateson, 1996; Kacelnik and Mouden, 2013). However, Scalar Utility Theory predicts
preference of risk aversion alone (when variability is in the amount of food) whereas there are empirical findings
that report preference of risk proneness, which cannot be ignored. More importantly, the mechanistic (proximate)
explanation based on the psychophysical features does not need to deny the functional (ultimate) explanations
since they are complementary rather than competing alternatives. Based on a meta-analysis of the same studies
listed in Kacelnik and Bateson (1996) as well as more recent ones, for instance, Shafir (2000) draws a conclusion
different from that of Kacelnik and Mouden (2013) and Kacelnik and Bateson (1996). While applying Weber’s law
as well, Shafir (2000) presents regression-based results that accommodate both risk aversion and risk proneness to
be compatible with the budget rule, which integrates the functional and mechanistic explanations; the direction of
preference is determined by functional considerations (the budget rule) and the strength of preference by perceptual
considerations (Weber’s law). Rather than exclusively deducing either risk sensitivity or risk indifference per study,
Shafir (2000) examines the ‘degree’ of risk sensitivity from a perceptual perspective and shows that there is a
gradient of responses to risk.
In this paper, we present a gradual view of risk sensitivity from a normative perspective and provide a gradual
version of the budget rule, which not only explains the empirically observed gradual nature of risk sensitivity, but
also can explain observations counted against the budget rule.
Critical Review of the Derivation of the Budget Rule
We review the formal derivation of the budget rule from the z-score model (Stephens, 1981; Stephens and Krebs,
1987) and point out what it overlooks. The z-score model assumes a small bird foraging in winter to survive a
night during which it cannot forage. We adopt notations similar to those of Stephens and Krebs (1987). The bird’s
energy reserve x at dusk is assumed to be normally distributed with mean µ and variance σ2. It is also assumed
that the bird has behavioural control over µ and σ, having to meet a fixed daily energetic requirement R to survive
the night. Fitness is proportional to short-term survivorship which is represented by a step function in the z-score
model, yielding the expected fitness to be proportional to the survival probability f . The model seeks to maximise
the survival probability
f = Pr(surviving the night)
= Pr (x > R)
= 1− Φ (z)
where z = R−µσ is a z-score and Φ(·) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distributionN0,1(·) with zero mean and unit variance. To maximise f for a given µ, one needs to check its first derivative
∂f
∂σ
= − ∂Φ
∂σ
= − dΦ
dz
∂z
∂σ
where ∂z∂σ =
µ−R
σ2 . Note that the sign of
∂f
∂σ is entirely determined by that of
∂z
∂σ in the sense that
dΦ
dz > 0 always
holds; if z decreases, then survival probability f increases and vice versa. The analytical derivation of the budget
rule then entirely focuses on the sign of ∂z∂σ (Stephens and Krebs, 1987). Given a constant mean and different
variances, it yields the effect of σ on z as follows;
∂z
∂σ
> 0 if µ > R,
∂z
∂σ
< 0 if µ < R.
On positive budgets µ > R, the standard deviation σ should be reduced to decrease z. On negative budgets µ < R,
σ should be increased to decrease z. This yields the extreme variance rule, predicting that the smallest variance
2
possible is the optimal behaviour to be chosen on positive budgets and the largest variance possible on negative
budgets (Stephens and Krebs, 1987). The budget rule is a special case of the extreme variance rule with the smallest
variance being zero, predicting the optimal risk sensitivity of risk aversion on positive budgets and risk proneness
on negative budgets.
A caveat of this and its standard interpretation is an all-or-nothing view on animal decision-making, focusing
mainly on optimal behaviour. According to this all-or-nothing view, if an animal’s response to variability does
not comply with the optimal risk sensitivity (in a statistically significant sense), it is counted against the budget
rule (Kacelnik and Bateson, 1996; Kacelnik and Mouden, 2013). However, comparison of observed and predicted
behaviours is not sufficient for testing a behavioural theory and one should not reject the theory without comparing
the fitness of them (Mangel, 1991). Not all of the observations different from the prediction should be treated
the same. If the difference in fitness between observed and predicted behaviours is insignificant, for instance, one
should not use the observation to reject the theory. The degree of risk sensitivity under different experimental
conditions is thus more informative than merely testing whether the response to risk complies with the prediction
of the budget rule; according to the meta-analysis of the same empirical studies listed in Kacelnik and Bateson
(1996), animals indeed show a gradient of responses to risk, the degree of risk sensitivity forming a continuum
(Shafir, 2000). While the conclusion of Shafir (2000) is based on different groups of subjects under different
energy budgets, the gradual nature of risk-sensitive responses within the same individuals is also observed (Bacon
et al., 2010; Hurly, 2003). Thus, a more gradual view of the budget rule needs to be sought. Another caveat of
the derivation is the z-score centric view. Since the z-score has an unlimited range of −∞ < z <∞ whereas the
survival probability has a limited range of 0 ≤ f(z) ≤ 1 with a one-to-one correspondence between z and f(z),
a large change in z can yield little change in f(z). If foraging options significantly differ in z, a z-score centric
view can misleadingly imply a strong risk sensitivity whereas there is actually a weak risk sensitivity or a risk
indifference due to little difference in corresponding survival probability f(z).
Gradual Nature of Risk Sensitivity
There already exists a theoretical consideration on a gradual nature of risk sensitivity. Caraco and Lima (1985)
formulated decreasing risk aversion of the z-score model based on the marginal rate of substitution (Keeney and
Raiffa, 1976),
∂z
∂(σ2)
∂z
∂µ
=
R− µ
2σ2
=
z
2σ
.
A caveat of this analysis is that the gradual nature of risk sensitivity is considered only along an indifference curve
of a constant z-score equivalent to a constant survival probability; the analysis varies mean µ and variance σ2
such that a constant z-score is maintained. This is less compatible with the standard design of risk sensitivity
experiments that offer a choice between a variable (σ 6= 0) and a constant (σ = 0) feeding option with the same
mean, yielding the options to differ in z-score.
The Arrow-Pratt measure popular in economics (Pratt, 1964)
ρ = −u
′′(x)
u′(x)
is often used as a risk aversion measure where u(x) is a utility (or fitness) function (Real and Caraco, 1986).
Decreasing risk aversion is indicated by ρ′ = dρdx < 0. A caveat is that it is a local measure. It only informs of the
response to risk at a single point along the fitness function whereas risk sensitivity deals with problems that require
more than information at a single point to predict preference, probability distributions spreading likelihood over
many possible amounts (Stephens and Krebs, 1987). Moreover, the Arrow-Pratt measure for the z-score model is
not well defined since u′(x) = u′′(x) = 0 due to the fitness function u(x) being a step function (i.e. piece-wise
constant).
These caveats of the existing measures call for an alternative measure of gradual nature of risk sensitivity,
which should satisfy the following requirements:
(1) It should reflect risk sensitivity in a choice between a variable and a constant feeding option with the same
mean.
(2) It should take into consideration the whole distribution of reserve rather than a single value of it.
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Measure of Risk Sensitivity
We propose a measure of risk sensitivity from a normative perspective
S =
U(µ, σ)− U(µ, 0)
4Umax
where U(µ, σ) is the expected fitness of a feeding option with mean µ and variance σ2, and 4Umax is the max-
imum possible difference in U . It satisfies the aforementioned two requirements. It takes into consideration the
whole distribution of reserve x at dusk in the sense that rather than fitness u(x) at a single value x, it uses ex-
pected fitness U(µ, σ) =
∫ Nµ,σ(x)u(x)dx obtained by averaging or integrating u(x) with the normal distribution
Nµ,σ(x) of reserve x. It also reflects a choice between a variable and a constant feeding option with the same
mean since it involves the expected fitness U(µ, σ) of the variable option and U(µ, 0) of the constant option.
The reason why animals should show risk sensitivity in a normative sense is a consequence in expected fitness,
which is well reflected in the proposed measure S of risk sensitivity; the greater difference in expected fitness
U(µ, σ) − U(µ, 0) between the options, the greater sensitivity of risk should animals show. For instance, the
greater is the expected fitness U(µ, σ) of the variable option than U(µ, 0) of the constant option (i.e. the greater
is S), the greater is selection pressure for preferring the variable option (i.e. the greater is risk proneness). Note
that the proposed measure S is invariant under an affine transformation of the expected fitness U . In other words,
even if U is transformed into Y = aU + b via scaling by a and offsetting by b, the risk sensitivity measured by
S remains the same, S = U(µ,σ)−U(µ,0)4Umax =
Y (µ,σ)−Y (µ,0)
4Y max . This affine-invariance of S is due to the division by4Umax and the subtraction U(µ, σ) − U(µ, 0). One of the reasons why the Arrow-Pratt measure involves the
division by u′(x) is to maintain the affine-invariance. The affine-invariance of S is important; for instance, the
animal’s internal representation may not use expected fitness U directly, but its affine transformation Y .
Since the expected fitness in the z-score model is proportional to the survival probability f and 4fmax = 1,
we have S = f(µ,σ)−f(µ,0)4fmax = f(µ, σ) − f(µ, 0) due to the affine-invariance; note that the maximum possible
difference in f is 4fmax = 1 since probability f ranges from 0 to 1. The difference in survival probability
4f(µ, σ) = f(µ, σ) − f(µ, 0) between a variable and a constant foraging option with the same mean µ thus
serves as a measure of risk sensitivity that an animal should show due to a consequence in expected fitness. The
sign of4f can discriminate between risk aversion and risk proneness. 4f < 0 implies selection for risk aversion
since the survival probability of the constant option f(µ, 0) is higher than that of the variable option f(µ, σ)
whereas 4f > 0 implies selection for risk proneness. The magnitude of 4f indicates strength of selection for
risk sensitivity; the larger |4f |, the stronger selection pressure for risk sensitivity. For instance, the larger is
|4f | while 4f < 0, the stronger is the selection pressure for risk aversion; thus, the more frequent choice of the
constant option over the variable one.
Formal Derivation of Gradual Risk Sensitivity
With the measure of risk sensitivity 4f(µ, σ), we now derive the gradual nature of risk sensitivity from the z-
score model. We are particularly interested in the degree of risk sensitivity with respect to the energy budget. In
other words, for a given variable option σ (and the other option being a constant one), how does the degree of risk
sensitivity vary as mean reserve µ varies? For this, we need to compute ∂ |4f |∂µ that is the rate of change in (the
magnitude of) risk sensitivity |4f | as µ increases for a given σ. Especially, the sign of ∂ |4f |∂µ is useful; ∂ |4f |∂µ < 0
indicates decreasing risk sensitivity whereas ∂ |4f |∂µ > 0, increasing risk sensitivity.
On positive budgets µ > R, we have4f(µ, σ) = f(µ, σ)−f(µ, 0) = f(µ, σ)−1 < 0 (i.e. risk aversion) since
the constant option guarantees the survival (i.e. f(µ, 0) = 1) whereas the variable one cannot (i.e. f(µ, σ) < 1).
Since
∣∣4f(µ, σ)∣∣ = − (f(µ, σ)− 1), we have ∂ |4f |∂µ = − ∂f∂µ . For a given σ, we have
∂f
∂µ
= − dΦ
dz
∂z
∂µ
=
1√
2pi
exp
(
− (R− µ)
2
2σ2
)
1
σ
Note that ∂f∂µ > 0 always holds for σ > 0 and thus
∂ |4f |
∂µ < 0. In other words, the strength of selection for risk
aversion or the degree of risk aversion |4f | decreases as µ increases on positive budgets for a given σ. Moreover,
we have f(µ, σ) → 1 as µ increases for a given σ since f = 1 − Φ (z) and Φ (z) → 0 as z = R−µσ → −∞. In
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Figure 1: Gradual nature of risk sensitivity. (a) Three pairs of distributions for a variable (σ 6= 0) and a
constant (σ = 0) foraging option are shown, each pair having an equal mean. The overnight survival
threshold R is indicated by a dashed line. For a given variance σ2, the difference in survival probability
between a variable and a constant option changes, depending on the mean µ of each reserve distribu-
tion. Note that the survival probability is equal to the area under the distribution graph beyond R. As the
mean of a distribution increases on positive budgets, the difference in survival probability between a pair
of the options decreases from 12 to 0. In other words, the strength of selection for risk aversion gradually
decreases and can diminish as the mean increases; i.e. decreasing and diminishing risk aversion. For
instance, the distribution for the variable option that is the furthest away from the threshold has the sur-
vival probability close to 1 while the probability for the constant option is 1 and so the difference is close
to 0; i.e. weak selection for risk aversion. The further away from the threshold, the weaker selection for
risk sensitivity. (b) The survival probability f as a function of standard deviation σ of the reserve distri-
bution with mean µ = 1.1, 1.5, and 2.3 and threshold R = 1 as those in (a). As µ increases for a given σ,
f increases and approaches to 1, the optimal probability obtained at σ = 0; for example, σ = 0.33 used
for the three distributions in (a) is indicated by a dotted line. The higher µ, the wider range of σ yielding
f close to 1.
other words, the survival is almost guaranteed even if the variable option is chosen as long as the reserve mean is
high enough. Hence, we have |4f | → 0 as µ increases for a given σ; i.e. there is little difference in the survival
probability between the feeding options if the reserve mean is high enough. The conclusion is that on positive
budgets, the strength of selection for risk aversion monotonically decreases and can diminish as the reserve mean
increases for a given variance. This gradual and diminishing nature of risk aversion can be intuitively understood
as well; see Fig. 1.
On negative budgets, by a similar argument, the strength of selection for risk proneness monotonically de-
creases and can diminish as the mean decreases for a given variance; see Fig. 2. In other words, the degree of
optimal risk sensitivity predicted by the conventional budget rule gradually changes. Being purely based on an
adaptive rationale, this ‘gradual’ view of the z-score model (or the gradual budget rule hereafter) predicts that the
conventional budget rule holds if the difference in expected fitness (or survival probability) between the feeding
options is significant (e.g. when the reserve mean is close to starvation threshold for a given deviation) and may
not do so otherwise, risk sensitivity gradually weakening. The gradual budget rule not only encompasses the con-
ventional budget rule as a special case of it, but also may explain empirical results that are often counted against
the conventional budget rule and the adaptive rationale of risk sensitivity behind it.
Weak Selection Pressure vs.Weak Risk Sensitivity
The empirical findings that report risk indifference or weak risk sensitivity used to be counted against the conven-
tional budget rule (Kacelnik and Bateson, 1996; Kacelnik and Mouden, 2013). According to the gradual budget
rule, however, if the difference in expected fitness between the feeding options is insignificant, risk indifference
is feasible in the sense that there is weak selection for the optimal risk sensitivity predicted by the conventional
budget rule and, thus, weak selection against risk indifference. Note that weak selection for the optimal risk sensi-
tivity does not imply strong selection for risk indifference, the latter of which would predict only risk indifference.
Instead, it implies weak selection against suboptimal risk sensitivity as well as risk indifference in the sense that
there is little difference in expected fitness between the optimal and the suboptimal risk sensitivity. In other words,
risk aversion, risk proneness and risk indifference are all feasible under the condition of weak selection, which may
explain empirically observed risk indifference and suboptimal risk sensitivity such as risk proneness on positive
budgets and risk aversion on negative budgets. Thus, one should not simply conclude that any observation appar-
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Figure 2: (a) The values of the survival probability f(µ, σ) with the threshold R = 1 are plotted as gray-
level intensities on the µ − σ plane. Contours corresponding to f = 0.05, 0.1, · · · , 0.9, 0.95 are also
plotted. (b) The probability residuals 4f(µ, σ) = f(µ, σ) − f(µ, 0) are plotted in colour. Showing the
difference in survival probabilities between variable and constant foraging options, the residual indicates
levels of selection pressure for risk sensitivity. Contours at 4f = −0.5,−0.45, · · · , 0.45, 0.5. The larger
|4f | with 4f > 0, the stronger selection pressure for risk proneness (red-white); the larger |4f | with
4f < 0, the stronger selection pressure for risk aversion (blue-black); 4f ≈ 0, weak selection pressure
for risk sensitivity (green).
ently contradicting the optimal risk sensitivity challenges the conventional budget rule and the adaptive rationale
of risk sensitivity behind it. Instead, one should take into consideration the expected fitness of the observation and
that of the optimal risk sensitivity.
Risk proneness on positive budgets and risk aversion on negative budgets
Other than the argument of weak selection, can we provide additional explanations why risk sensitivity (especially,
suboptimal risk sensitivity such as risk proneness on positive budgets and risk aversion on negative budgets) rather
than risk indifference can be empirically observed in a statistically significant sense? Any model is an approxima-
tion or simplification of the reality, leaving out many features. The z-score model that the budget rule is formally
derived from incorporates the survival, but leaves out other functional and mechanistic features such as reproduc-
tion and perception. Under the condition of weak selection for the optimal risk sensitivity (e.g. the reserve mean
is distant enough from the survival threshold for a given variance), any of risk proneness, risk aversion and risk
indifference is feasible from the gradual view of the z-score model. However, only one of them may be feasible
from the perspective of a feature that the z-score model leaves out, say, reproduction; e.g. only risk proneness may
yield expected fitness substantially higher than that of any other alternatives in terms of reproduction. We elaborate
this aspect.
Being built upon the z-score model, the twin threshold model seeks to maximise the combined probability g of
surviving the night and succeeding in reproduction (Hurly, 2003)
g(µ, σ) = wPr(surviving the night) + (1− w) Pr(succeeding in reproduction)
= wPr (x > R) + (1− w) Pr (x > Q)
= w
(
1− Φ
(
R− µ
σ
))
+ (1− w)
(
1− Φ
(
Q− µ
σ
))
where Q is reproduction threshold, R < Q and w ∈ [0, 1]. Whereas the original twin threshold model uses
combination weights w and 1, we use the convex combination of the two probabilities with w and 1 − w to
ensure that the combination g(µ, σ) remains a probability. With starvation threshold R and reproduction threshold
Q, their associated residual or difference in probability 4g(µ, σ) = g(µ, σ) − g(µ, 0) is qualitatively different
from the residual 4f(µ, σ) associated with a single threshold R; see Fig. 3. As empirically observed from some
species, the twin threshold model predicts risk proneness on positive budgets (i.e.4g > 0 being significant) in
a range of parameters (µ, σ) where reserve mean µ is close to but lower than reproduction threshold Q. This
makes sense since risk proneness offers a possibility of reproduction whereas risk aversion does not. In the same
range of parameters, the gradual budget rule can yield weak selection pressure for the optimal risk sensitivity
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Figure 3: Comparison of gradual risk sensitivity between the z-score model and the twin threshold model.
(a) The gradual risk sensitivity 4f from the z-score model with R = 1. For a given standard deviation
σ, the degree of risk sensitivity (risk aversion) |4f | on positive budgets µ > R gradually decreases and
diminshes as mean µ increases, which can yield any of risk proneness and risk indifference as well as
risk aversion due to weak selection pressure, for instance, 4f ≈ 0.0 near at (µ, σ) = (2.9, 1.0). (b)
The gradual risk sensitivity 4g from the twin threshold model with R = 1, Q = 3, and w = 12 . For a
given σ, the degree of risk sensitivity (risk aversion) |4g| on positive budgets gradually decreases and
diminishes as µ increases up to µ = 2 and then the degree of risk sensitivity (risk proneness) |4g|
gradually increases as µ increases up to µ = Q, the latter of which predicts only risk proneness, refining
the prediction based on 4f , for instance, 4g ≈ 0.25 near at (µ, σ) = (2.9, 1.0).
predicted by the conventional budget rule (i.e.4f being insignificant) and so predicts that any of risk proneness,
risk aversion or risk indifference is feasible, there being little difference in expected fitness between them. Near
at (µ, σ) = (2.9, 1.0), for instance, we have 4g ≈ 0.25 whereas 4f ≈ 0.0 in Fig. 3. Rather than conflicted
predictions, the inclusion of reproduction feature refines the predictions based on only survival feature in the sense
that the latter predicts any of risk proneness, risk aversion or risk indifference to be feasible and the first predicts
only one of them (i.e. risk proneness) to be feasible. Note that they make similar predictions when both of the
models are under conditions of strong selection, i.e. near starvation threshold R. As reserve mean µ is lowered and
becomes close to starvation thresholdR on positive budgets for a given variance σ2, for instance, selection pressure
for risk proneness to succeed in reproduction weakens whereas selection pressure for risk aversion to survive the
night strengthens and, thus, the gradual view of the twin threshold model predicts risk aversion as the gradual view
of the z-score model does. Near at (µ, σ) = (1.1, 1.0), for instance, we have 4g ≈ −0.25 and 4f ≈ −0.4 in
Fig. 3, both yielding strong selection pressure for risk aversion.
Another feature that the z-score model leaves out is the possibility of starvation (to death) during foraging,
which can explain risk aversion on negative budgets. A forager (e.g. a small bird) may have to ensure it stays above
a lethal boundary of reserves during foraging as well, which is lower than the overnight starvation threshold R.
There are models that take into consideration both possibilities of starvation during foraging and night, yielding a
prediction different from that of the z-score model (Houston and McNamara, 1985; Stephens, 1982; Stephens and Krebs, 1987).
For instance, the lazy-L model predicts risk aversion on negative budgets if the requirement to avoid the lethal
boundary is a lot stronger than the requirement to survive the night (Stephens, 1982; Stephens and Krebs, 1987).
This is especially so when there is enough time left for foraging until dusk and reserves are dangerously low.
As dusk approaches, however, the requirement to survive the night strengthens whereas the effect of the lethal
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boundary weakens, which makes the lazy-L model become more equivalent to the z-score model (Stephens, 1982;
Stephens and Krebs, 1987); increasing risk proneness on negative budgets is thus predicted by both models as
reserve mean increases.
In summary, additional features that the z-score model leaves out can refine predictions made by the gradual
budget rule under conditions of weak selection, which may explain risk proneness on positive budgets and risk
aversion on negative budgets, contrary to the predictions of the conventional budget rule.
Discussion
We derived the gradual budget rule that normatively reflects the gradual nature of risk sensitivity and encompasses
the conventional budget rule as a special case. The gradual budget rule better fits the empirical findings including
those that used to challenge the conventional budget rule. The proposed measure of gradual risk sensitivity S =
U(µ,σ)−U(µ,0)
4Umax is only applicable to a choice between a variable (σ 6= 0) and a constant feeding option (σ = 0) with
the same mean µ. We can relax some of the conditions on S and generalise it for a wider range of choices. Instead
of insisting on one of the feeding options to be a constant one, we may consider that both options are variable and
we then have Sσ =
U(µ,σ1)−U(µ,σ2)
4Umax . Note that S is a special case of Sσ with σ2 = 0. We may further relax the
condition that both options should have the same mean µ and we then have Sµ,σ =
U(µ1,σ1)−U(µ2,σ2)
4Umax . Note that
Sσ is a special case of Sµ,σ with µ1 = µ2 = µ while S is a special case with µ1 = µ2 = µ and σ2 = 0. In the
remaining part of this section, we critically compare and discuss other relevant work.
Partial Preference and Behavioural Landscapes
A metric relevant to the gradual risk sensitivity is the canonical cost of a suboptimal behaviour c = U∗−U where
U∗ is the expected fitness for the optimal behaviour and U for a suboptimal behaviour (McNamara and Houston,
1986). A caveat of this metric is that it is not affine-invariant. For instance, the expected fitness scaled by a 6= 0 fails
the invariance, i.e.U∗ − U 6= aU∗ − aU ; rather than expected fitness itself (i.e. the expected number of offspring
surviving to adulthood), note that a scaled expected fitness is often used (Nevai et al., 2007). As a function of the
canonical cost c, the probability of choosing a suboptimal behaviour can be derived, assuming that the perception
of expected fitness U is subject to error (McNamara and Houston, 1987). When an animal makes a choice between
two simultaneously available options, one has pi(c) = exp(−βc)1+exp(−βc) for the probability of a suboptimal option and
1 − pi(c) for the optimal option where β is a positive free parameter (Houston, 1997). It yields pi(c) ≈ 12 when
c ≈ 0, predicting only risk indifference when there is little difference in expected fitness between the optimal and
a suboptimal behaviour in the context of risk sensitivity. Contrary to this prediction, however, risk proneness and
risk aversion should be feasible as well as risk indifference in the sense that selection against all of them is weak
when c ≈ 0.
Another relevant metric is U/U∗ where U is the expected fitness of an observed (suboptimal) behaviour and
U∗ is the expected fitness for the predicted (optimal) behaviour (Mangel, 1991); in the context of risk sensitivity,
we have U = U(µ, 0) and U∗ = U(µ, σ) on negative budgets and vice versa on positive budgets. A caveat of
this metric is that it is not affine-invariant. For instance, the expected fitness offset by b 6= 0 fails the invariance,
i.e.U/U∗ 6= (U + b) / (U∗ + b). Another caveat is that it cannot capture the gradual nature of risk sensitivity on
negative budgets since we have U/U∗ = U(µ, 0)/U(µ, σ) = 0 regardless of U∗ = U(µ, σ) 6= 0. This contrasts
the case on positive budgets where U/U∗ = U(µ, σ)/U(µ, 0) = U(µ, σ) gradually increases to 1 as mean µ
increases for a given variance σ2.
Scalar Utility Theory
Not viewing risk sensitivity as having adaptive value per se, Kacelnik and Mouden (2013) instead assert that it is
caused as a side-effect of perception and proposes SUT (Scalar Utility Theory) as an alternative to the conventional
budget rule (Kacelnik and e Abreu, 1998). SUT consists of two parts, modelling the animal’s knowledge of the food
amounts and postulating a decision process. Among feeding options with the same mean but different variances,
the memory representation of the option with smaller variance has larger skew-sensitive measures (e.g. mode and
median) as a consequence of Weber’s law. If the animal’s decision process uses the mode or other skew-sensitive
measures in comparing (the memory representations of) the feeding options, it is argued that the animal will prefer
the constant option since it provides an ‘apparently’ larger amount of food than the variable option does, yielding
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Figure 4: SUT (Scalar Utility Theory) for a choice among feeding options of equal means vs unequal
means. The memory representation of the constant feeding option F = 5 is shown as a solid curve.
The overall memory representation of the variable option is shown in shading while each of the small
and large amounts is indicated by a dashed curve. All of the three (normal) distributions have the
same coefficient of variation (SD/mean)= 0.3 which is empirically observed from starlings (Kacelnik and
e Abreu, 1998). The mean of each representation is indicated by a dotted line. (a) A variable option V
yields Vmin = 3 or Vmax = 7 with equal probability. The memory representations of the constant option
and the variable option have the same mean = 5. The mode of the constant option is 5 and the mode of
the variable one is 3; note that the mode of a probability distribution is the value at which the distribution
has its global maximum. According to SUT, the animal will prefer the constant option since its mode is
larger than that of the variable option, perceiving the amount of the first to be greater than that of the
latter and so yielding risk aversion (Kacelnik and e Abreu, 1998). SUT typically presents the case of the
same mean only, where both options yield the same expected fitness under the assumption of a linear
fitness relation (Kacelnik and Mouden, 2013). (b) A variable option V yields Vmin = 4 or Vmax = 8 with
equal probability. The mode of the variable option is 4 while the mean is 6. According to SUT, the animal
will still prefer the constant option since the mode of the constant one is larger than that of the variable
one (i.e. 5 > 4). However, the expected fitness of the constant option is lower than that of the variable
option since the mean of the constant one is less than that of the variable one (i.e. 5 < 6) and SUT
assumes a linear fitness relation, the expected fitness depending only on the mean of food amounts but
no other statistic. The hypothetical decision process of SUT yields an erroneous preference of a lower
expected fitness, against which there should be natural selection.
risk aversion; see Fig. 4a. Predicting only risk aversion regardless of energy budgets, however, this side-effect
assertion of SUT suffers from numerous caveats from both empirical and theoretical perspectives.
Weak empirical support
As the empirical evidence supporting SUT, Kacelnik and Mouden (2013) refer to a set of 22 studies reviewed
in Kacelnik and Bateson (1996), the majority of which report (consistent) risk aversion. However, those studies do
not manipulate the energy budgets of the subjects. Since the energy budgets are not manipulated, the conventional
budget rule cannot be fully tested nor fairly compared using these studies. Risk aversion reported from the studies
without budget manipulation does not exclusively support SUT in the sense that risk aversion is also predicted by
the conventional budget rule when the animals are on positive budgets. Even from a perspective of the conventional
budget rule, it is already understood that risk aversion occurs more often than risk proneness because the positive
budgets are commonly realised levels of energy budgets (Caraco, 1980). The 35 studies reviewed in Kacelnik and
Mouden (2013) are better suited to fairly test both SUT and the conventional budget rule using the same data set
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since these studies manipulated energy budgets; additional benefits include a larger number of studies as well as an
inclusion of more recent studies. Among the 35 studies, 8 report consistent risk aversion (as predicted by SUT), 11
of ‘some amount’ of risk aversion, and 16 of ‘no’ risk aversion. Only 8/35 support SUT, which is even lower than
10/35 of supporting the conventional budget rule. Empirical support of SUT is weaker than that of the conventional
budget rule.
Description but not explanation
Animals are assumed to prefer larger amounts of food (Kacelnik and Mouden, 2013). Depending on the statistics
of the memory representation used for assessing food amounts, however, the hypothetical decision process would
yield a different choice among feeding options with the same mean and different variances. If the mean of the
memory representation is assumed to be used, it yields no bias to variability of food amounts (i.e. risk indifference)
since the animal would ‘perceive’ the food amounts of the options to be the same. If the maximum is used, it
yields bias in favour of variability (i.e. risk proneness) since the animal would perceive the amount of the variable
option to be greater; its positively skewed memory representation leads to the maximum greater than that of the
symmetric distribution of the constant option. If the mode or median is used, it yields bias against variability
(i.e. risk aversion) since the animal would perceive the amounts of the constant option to be greater. What is
the rationale or justification of SUT’s assumption that the animal’s decision process would use the mode (or any
other skew-sensitive statistic) of the memory representations rather than an alternative statistic such as the mean
or maximum? If the mode is used in choice process, it would fit to the empirical data of animals’ bias against
variability of food amounts whereas either the mean or maximum would not (Kacelnik and e Abreu, 1998). This is
hardly an ‘explanation’ of the empirically observed bias, but seems to be no better than a ‘description’ of it, merely
fitting to the data. If the empirical data showed no bias related to variability, according to the logic of SUT, one
would simply assume the decision process used the mean since it would better fit to the data than other statistics
would. If the data showed a bias in favour of variability, one would just assume to use the maximum or any other
statistic that would yield the bias, according to the fitting-to-data logic of SUT.
Fitness consequence of erroneous preferences
Another caveat of the usage of the mode or any other skew-sensitive statistic is the functional problem of preferring
an option of lower fitness. Unlike other relevant theories in biology, psychology and economics, SUT assumes
fitness (or utility) as a ‘linear’ function of food amounts (Kacelnik and e Abreu, 1998). It is well known that, under
the linear relations, only the mean of food amounts has an effect on the mean of fitness (i.e. expected fitness),
but variance or any other variability-sensitive statistic does not (Houston and McNamara, 1999; Stephens and
Krebs, 1987). In any theory that assumes a linear fitness function as SUT does, the animal’s decision process is
thus expected to use and compare the mean of food amounts (i.e. preferring a feeding option of higher mean).
However, SUT assumes that the decision process uses a skew-sensitive statistic such as the mode (i.e. preferring
an option of higher mode). This is not a merely logical issue, but has a serious fitness consequence as well. If the
decision process is based on a skew-sensitive statistic (e.g. mode) as assumed by SUT, it can yield an erroneous
preference of an option whose expected fitness is lower than that of the alternative. Even though the mean amount
of a variable feeding option is higher than that of a constant one (and thus the expected fitness of the first is higher
than that of the latter), for example, the animal that makes a choice based on the mode will prefer the constant
one (of the lower expected fitness) if the mode of the variable one is lower than that of the constant one due to
the right-skew of the memory representation of the variable one; see Fig. 4b. Note that this problematic preference
of lower fitness is admitted for an earlier version of SUT based on a single sampling of memory representation
(Kacelnik and e Abreu, 1998). However, the problem persists with the later versions of SUT based on a skew-
sensitive statistic; any decision process that is based on a statistic other than the mean yields the problematic
preference although the conditions where the problem occurs may differ, depending on the statistic. There should
be natural selection against the erroneous decision process that uses a skew-sensitive statistic. For SUT to be a
genuinely mechanistic model predicting risk aversion, it should justify the usage of the mode (or any skew-sensitive
statistic such as the median or even the single sampling) on mechanistic grounds rather than merely assuming it.
For instance, suppose that (an algorithm or neural mechanism of) computation of the mode of a distribution is
significantly simpler than that of the mean such that it would even compensate the negative consequence due to the
mode-based choice, then it would make a good case for using the mode. To our knowledge, unfortunately, SUT
seems to lack of any related attempts (Kacelnik and e Abreu, 1998; Kacelnik and Mouden, 2013).
In summary, even though Weber’s law as a universal principle of psychophysics is empirically well supported,
it merely supports one component of SUT, i.e. a Weberian memory representation of food amounts (Bateson and
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Kacelnik, 1995). However, it has little to do with supporting the key component of SUT, i.e. the hypothetical deci-
sion process based on skew-sensitive statistics to yield only risk aversion, which suffers from numerous caveats.
Comparison to Hybrid Explanations
Contrary to SUT that predicts only risk aversion, one can accommodate both risk aversion and risk proneness to be
compatible with the conventional budget rule even though Weber’s law is applied (Shafir, 2000). While revealing
a gradual nature of risk sensitivity from a meta-analysis based on regressions, Shafir (2000) concludes that the
direction of preference is determined by functional considerations (complying with the conventional budget rule)
and the strength of preference by perceptual considerations (complying with Weber’s law). When risk aversion
is predicted by the conventional budget rule, for instance, the regression coefficient is positive, indicating that
an increase in relative variability yields stronger risk aversion. According to Weber’s law, relative variability or
the coefficient of variation CV= σµ correlates with capability of perceptual discrimination between a variable and
a constant feeding option. Thus, the stronger risk aversion or the increasing preference of a constant option on
positive budgets with increasing CV of the variable feeding option is explained by perceptual considerations in
the sense that perceptual discrimination of a constant option (i.e. the optimal choice) from a variable one (i.e. the
suboptimal choice) improves as the difference in CV between the options increases (Shafir, 2000). On the other
hand, it is argued that the functional considerations based on the conventional budget rule are unable to predict this
changing level of risk sensitivity between experimental conditions (Shafir, 2000; Shafir et al., 2005). According to
the gradual budget rule, however, even the strength of preference can be explained by functional considerations as
well. For a given standard deviation σ 6= 0, as mean µ decreases on positive budgets, the difference in expected
fitness between the feeding options increases (i.e. selection pressure for risk aversion strengthens) while the dif-
ference in CV increases as well since CV= σµ negatively correlates with mean µ. A positive correlation between
strength of risk aversion and CV thus stems from functional considerations (complying with the gradual budget
rule) as well.
Empirical Tests of the Gradual Budget Rule
While the aforementioned meta-analysis supports the gradual budget rule, it is based on different groups of subjects
under different energy budgets. To empirically test the gradual budget rule within the same individuals, one needs
to involve a wide range of parameters. Instead of a single or a limited range of reserve mean on positive budgets,
for instance, a wider range should be tested out since the gradual budget rule not only predicts a richer set of
risk sensitivity than the conventional budget rule does, but also complies with the latter, depending on the reserve
mean. For example, hummingbirds not only become more risk-averse on positive budgets as the reserve mean gets
closer to the survival threshold, but also show more risk proneness on positive budgets when the reserve mean gets
further away from the threshold (Hurly, 2003). European starlings become more risk-averse on positive budgets as
ambient temperature decreases, the latter of which is equivalent to raising the survival threshold, yielding a reserve
mean closer to it (Bateson, 2002).
Conclusions
We proposed the gradual budget rule, which normatively reflects the gradual nature of risk sensitivity and encom-
passes the energy budget rule as a special case. The gradual budget rule predicts significant selection pressure
for the risk sensitivity complying with the energy budget rule in a limited range of parameters and less significant
pressure in the remaining range, the latter of which can allow for behaviours not complying with the energy budget
rule and explains some of the empirical findings that used to be counted against the energy budget rule as well as
the adaptive value of risk sensitivity.
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